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Abstract
In their paperHow Fundamental Physics represents Causality (2014)
Andreas Bartels and Daniel Wohlfarth maintain that there is place for
causality in General Relativity. Their argument contains two steps:
First they show that there are time-asymmetric models in General
Relativity, then they claim to derive that two events are causally con-
nected if and only if there is a time-asymmetric energy ﬂow from one
event to the other. In our comment we ﬁrst give a short summary of
their paper followed by a section introducing and pondering diﬀerent
conceptions of causation since Bartels and Wohlfarth avoid declaring
explicitly which notion of causation they build on in the paper. In
order to analyze their argument in detail we formalize their crucial
step in logical terms. This helps to sharpen the question whether their
proposed derivation is not just a deﬁnition.
1 Grounding (not Reducing) Causality
The question about causality seems to be ubiquitous in the natural sciences
and especially in physics. Why and how did the universe evolve? Why is
there life on earth? What caused a particle to have that particular trajec-
tory? But if we look closer and examine our physical theories in detail, the
issue of how exactly to answer such questions is not that clear. Bertrand
Russell was famous for stressing that our fundamental physical theories do
not tell us anything about causal relations in their domain since the equa-
tions ﬁguring in these theories are time-reversal invariant, and causation
seems to be parasitic on time-asymmetry.1 Even present-day philosophers of
science, such as John Norton, do not grant causality any role in physics, be-
cause there is no universal principle of causality that holds true of our science
unless physical theories are restricted to appropriately hospitable domains.2
∗University of Lausanne (UNIL), BMario.Hubert@unil.ch
†MCMP/LMU Munich, BR.Poellinger@lmu.de
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In contrast, physicists themselves normally adhere to an intuition very
close to what is known as causal fundamentalism, which claims that the job
of all of physics is to uncover the prevalent causal relations in nature. In one
of the most famous modern textbooks on classical electrodynamics one ﬁnds
the following pointed aﬃrmation –
[. . . ] the most sacred tenet in all of physics: the principle of
causality.3
Neo-Russellians, such as Huw Price, in general still deny causal relations
any role in physics, but acknowledge their importance in the special sciences
and in common sense reasoning.
However, there are also philosophers like Mathias Frisch, who take up a
position between the Neo-Russellians and the causal fundamentalists. Frisch
for example claims that causal notions can play a role in physics and do
play a role in certain domains when one adds an interpretation to the formal
apparatus of a physical theory, which ﬁnally allows us to apply the machinery
of causal reasoning again.
A seemingly imperative task prior to the quest for causal relations in
physics is to try to establish the direction of time within the physical theo-
ries under consideration, e.g., with the help of entropy and the second law
of thermodynamics (thermodynamic arrow of time), the expansion of the
universe (cosmological arrow of time), or the direction of retarded waves (ra-
diative arrow of time). Although these explanations of the direction of time
are not unproblematic, the question we are concerned with here is this one:
How can we use the time-asymmetry within physical theories in searching
for causality?
Following this route, Andreas Bartels and Daniel Wohlfarth set out to
show in their paper How Fundamental Physics represents Causality4 that
there is place for causality in one of our most successful fundamental theories,
namely General Relativity (GR). As time-asymmetry is supposed to be a
necessary condition for causal relations, their strategy is ﬁrst to show in
what sense General Relativity is time-asymmetric. Having done that, they
provide a description on how to build causality on it. Throughout the paper
they emphasize that the time-reversal invariance of the equations does not
imply that the solutions must be time-symmetric.
This point is often ignored; so we explicitly want to give the deﬁnitions.
An equation – respectively a law if the law is mathematically formulated as
an equation – is said to be time-symmetric (time-reversal invariant) iﬀ for
any solution f(t) of that equation f(−t) also presents a solution. We call a
function f(t) – which is in the most interesting cases a solution of a law-like
3Cf. (Griﬃths, 1999, p. 425).
4Cf. (Bartels and Wohlfarth, 2014).
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equation – time-symmetric iﬀ there is a t0 such that f(t0 + t) = f(t0− t) for
all t.
The construction of time-asymmetry by Bartels and Wohlfarth relies on
the work of Mario Castagnino,5 who considers models of space-time which
can be described by the scale factor and a matter ﬁeld. It turns out that
these models are typically time-asymmetric w.r.t. cosmic time.
The next task is to deduce local time-asymmetry by constructing a non-
vanishing, continuous, time-like vector ﬁeld on the time-orientable space-
time. Starting from the energy-momentum tensor
Tμν =
1
8π
(
Rμν − 12gμνR− Λgμν
)
, (1)
with Rμν the Ricci tensor, R the Ricci curvature, Λ the cosmological con-
stant, and gμν the metrical tensor, we get (after imposing further restrictions
on the energy-momentum tensor)
Tμν = s0V 0μ V
0
ν +
3∑
i=1
siV
i
μV
i
ν , (2)
such that s0 ≥ 0, si ∈ R, V iν are space-like vector ﬁelds for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3},
and V 0μ is a time-like vector ﬁeld on the space-time manifold. Making ex-
plicit the space-time coordinate x, V 0μ (x) is the supposed non-vanishing,
continuous, time-like vector ﬁeld that establishes the necessary local time-
asymmetry by being a means of distinguishing between the semi-light-cones
on every space-time point. Furthermore, there is a physical quantity con-
nected to V 0μ (x): T0μ is interpreted as the energy ﬂow in the direction of
V 0μ (x).
Finally, causality may enter the arena as stated in the paper:
[W]e ﬁnd a physical vector ﬁeld on which the time-asymmetric
causal connection between events can be based. We will say
that events C and E are causally connected iﬀ there is a time-
asymmetric energy ﬂow from C to E.
This is the crux of how Bartels and Wohlfarth anchor causality in General
Relativity. We will discuss their proposal in the following. In Section 2 we
introduce the most prominent theories of causation and ask what concept
of causation Bartels and Wohlfarth use. We then examine in Section 3 the
details of how they ground causality in General Relativity upon formalizing
the above quotation. Section 4 presents a short summary and outlook.
5Cf. (Castagnino et al., 2003a,c,b; Castagnino and Lombardi, 2009).
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2 Concepts of Causation
Outside of physics (many times on the border), philosophers have been think-
ing systematically about cause and eﬀect since the very beginnings and even
more rigorously with the introduction of mathematical methods and formal
semantics into the discipline in the last century. Epistemology and philoso-
phy of science at once had the means to shape prevailing problems in sym-
bolic form, express achievements with scientiﬁc stringency, and sort issues
within formal theories from questions about intuitions and basal premisses.
Select approaches to characterizing causal relations shall be outlined in the
following to give an overview over the problems a causal theorist is facing
when casting plausible analysis in formal structure.
David Hume’s famous quote may be seen as the point of reference for
many formal theories – he makes out an essentially structural unifying feature
of causal relations when he claims in 1748 that “[w]e may define a cause to
be an object followed by another, and where all objects, similar to the first,
are followed by objects similar to the second.” This portion of An Enquiry
about Human Understanding (Section VII) becomes the corner stone of the
regular and ultimately probabilistic analysis of causation connected with
the names of, e.g., Good and Reichenbach or also Suppes, who explicitly
builds the direction of time into his account to express our intuitions about
the temporal asymmetry in formal manner: A cause must necessarily be
correlated with its eﬀect and precede it.
Nancy Cartwright is well-known for her critique of a purely mathemati-
cal, thin characterization of causation, especially of the one based merely on
regularities or correlations – she ultimately emphasizes the experimenter’s
knowledge about the experimental setup and ties methodology and interpre-
tation together as two sides of the same causal coin. In her eyes, transferring
causal knowledge from narrowly deﬁned lab conditions to situations of larger
scale or everyday experience cannot follow one single principle, on the con-
trary, it must naturally be as diverse (though maybe family-like) in character
as the methodology applied in the ﬁrst place itself. What is important for our
discussion, though, is her standpoint that causality cannot be a monolithic,
fundamental concept due to its multifarious nature.
The proponents of an interventionist accounts of causation agree with
Cartwright on one central thing: They acknowledge the problems of a mere
statistical analysis of causality. The interventionist theorist wants to do
better by adding an element of counterfactual analysis to the probabilis-
tic framework without being accused at the same time of metaphysically
overloading our mostly solid notion of causation. Structural hypothetical
interventions, utilized for the test of causal eﬃcacy and formally expressed
as ﬁxing the value of a (random) variable in a Bayesian network, connect
with a scientist’s practice and mathematical toolbox at the same time –
without causation coming under the suspicion of being reduced to an an-
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thropomorphic concept. Causes are expressed as diﬀerence-makers in given
circumstances.
Interventionist theorists as Judea Pearl clearly localize causal relation-
ships with underlying physical mechanisms on the objective side of things and
dismiss a subjective or even epistemic reading. The interventionist frame-
work is open to this reading, nevertheless. Ultimately, deciding upon the
set of variables considered illuminating for the analysis to be conducted is
obviously a subjective (sometimes highly pragmatic) process that may dif-
fer from one epistemic agent to the next even if performed in compliance
with rational standards. Jon Williamson, for example, is opting for a fruit-
ful exploration of causal graphs as bearers of epistemic contents and direct
enablers of meaningful communication. Cases of causation by omission, the
distinction whether a result was actively obtained or passively not prevented,
as well as the question how to determine accountability on the basis of causal
eﬃcacy can be made transparent in an epistemic account without much has-
sle.
Now, when Bartels and Wohlfarth set out to search for fundamental
prints of causation in physical grounds, which of the many readings of cau-
sation do they have in mind, or in other words: What might constitute a
good candidate set of features for them that makes a causal relation causal?
Just as Bartels and Wohlfarth some philosophers have tried to take a
diﬀerent perspective and approach the task of formalizing intuitions about
causality from a point of view closer to physics. The causal powers theorist
is straightforwardly asking the question why not to introduce causality as a
basic power and ascribe essential causal capacities to objects of reality. Dis-
positions are meant to be necessarily separate from their token instantiations,
but at the same time linked to those instantiations of themselves through
a necessary causal relation: Causal powers (as Popper’s propensities) are
seen as enduring states with the disposition to objectively produce events
or states by singularly contributing observable quantities to their manifesta-
tions. Problems with this account arise as soon as we ask about the nature
of the connection between those powers and their manifestations. And: Can
one really postulate a certain disposition if it, for example, never manifests
itself? And if we want time-asymmetry to be built into the expression of a
causal relation: Is there a way to understand the directedness of powers as
necessary causal directedness from cause towards eﬀect?
Processes seem to be another promising fundamental building block can-
didate for a theory of causation. At the core of process theories lies the
explication of world lines and their intersection, understood as more basic
than the causal relation between events. Phil Dowe extends Wesley Salmon’s
material work6 by introducing exchanged conserved quantities, such as linear
momentum, mass-energy, or charge, to make it empirically applicable.
6Cf. (Salmon, 1997).
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Dowe’s theory relies on the following two propositions:7
1. A causal interaction is an intersection of world lines which involves
exchange of a conserved quantity.
2. A causal process is a world line of an object which possesses a conserved
quantity.
A world line is the collection of points in space-time that represents the
history of an object. A process is understood as the world line of an object,
regardless of whether or not it possesses any conserved quantities. As we are
here concerned with causation in fundamental physics, an object is anything
found in the ontology of a fundamental physical theory, e.g., particles, waves,
or ﬁelds. A conserved quantity is any quantity that is universally conserved
in our actual physical world. Our current fundamental physical theories tell
us what these quantities are (most prominently energy) and by which laws
they are governed.
An intersection simply is the overlapping of two or more processes in
space-time – it consists of all space-time points common to both (or all)
processes. An exchange occurs when at least one incoming and at least one
outgoing process undergo a change in the value of the conserved quantity
– in this case, “incoming” and “outgoing” are deﬁned with respect to the
light-cone structure of space-time.
With these deﬁnitions at hand one can ﬁnally state that events C and E
are causally connected (connected by a causal relation) iﬀ a continuous series
of causal processes and mediating interactions can be traced between them.
In this very coarse ﬁrst draft of a naïve process theory, however, it seems
that routine analysis returns too many causes, which can only be reduced
again by utilizing extra-theoretical knowledge or assumptions (against the
original goal of theoretically objectivizing the notion of a causal process).
Moreover, although the conserved quantity theory seeks to ground causal-
ity in physics it seems not to be compatible with GR.8 The most important
reason for this is the lack of an energy conservation law for most models of
GR. In general, energy is not a conserved quantity in this theory, and for
this very reason the notion of a physical process becomes meaningless if it is
to be built upon any deﬁnition of energy.
One can of course reply that the conserved quantity theory is applicable
to isolated physical systems where it is possible to reclaim conservation of
energy, and restrict oneself to these cases. However, isolated systems are
idealizations that are an abstraction of our actual world and, strictly speak-
ing, cannot be found therein. Current research raises further questions along
7Cf. e.g. (Dowe, 2000).
8The arguments for this proposition are taken from (Lam, 2005) referring to (Curiel,
2000) and (Rueger, 1998).
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these lines and beyond our considerations in this paper: Is it possible that
our actual world can perhaps be described by some space-time that allows
for a conservation of energy within GR? We shall move on to Bartels and
Wohlfarth’s bridge building between causal claims and physical terms.
3 Bridging Causality and Energy Flow
In order to elicit the energy-ﬂow T0μ from GR, Bartels and Wohlfarth impose
a myriad of restrictions on the space-time model they use. They only con-
sider models that can be described by the scale factor plus a matter ﬁeld.
Almost all of these models turn out to be time-asymmetric w.r.t. global time.
To establish local time-asymmetry and consequently energy-ﬂow they intro-
duce some further – rather technical – constraints on the energy-momentum
tensor. Is the resulting space-time model a model of the universe we live in?
Is causality thus grounded in the physical world or just in a special solution
of GR? Is it also possible to ground causality in space-time models other
than the ones described by a scale factor?
Bartels and Wohlfarth’s central statement ﬁnally is the formulation of
the link between two events’ causal and physical relation. Their ultimate
goal is to associate the time-asymmetric causal connection between events
with physical concepts in the aforementioned claim that
"events C and E are causally connected iﬀ there is a time-asymmetric
energy ﬂow from C to E."
This statement summarizes Bartels and Wohlfarth’s view that causal
asymmetry is not to be conventionally deﬁned by concepts anchored in
physics, but that it is rather “derived from global time-asymmetry” and thus
intrinsically physically endowed with two distinct directions.
We read the formulation “events C and E are causally connected” as
“event C causally contributes to event E” in order to avoid the interpretation
of C as the true, the sole, or the actual cause of E and, at the same time, to
avoid talk of prevented or potential causation and the like. To us causally
connected is just a very weak notion conveying that the event C plays a
certain (yet to be determined) causal role for the occurrence of E. However,
Bartels and Wohlfarth neither explain what they mean by causal connection
nor state what notion of causality they intend to ground in physics. Instead,
they introduce the following restrictions:
In order to avoid misunderstanding, we want to make it clear
in advance that we do not aim at a reduction of the concept of
causation to physics, i.e. we do not propose that causation can
in general be defined in terms of fundamental physical relations
as proposed by transfer theories of causation. [. . . ] We would
also not propose that notorious problems like the problem of ab-
sences and non-occurrences as causes can be suﬃciently tackled
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by means of a transfer theory of causation. Counterfactual mod-
els of causal reasoning may well play their role in physics, but we
see no way to generally deﬁne the notions employed in counter-
factual models of causation by recourse to elementary physical
relations (such as energy-momentum transfer).
Clearly, Bartels and Wohlfarth do not claim that all causal relations can
be explained as relations described by fundamental physics, nor do they want
to include omissions or counterfactual statements in their examination. They
continue:
We are exclusively concerned with causal asymmetry as a sine
qua non condition for the existence of causal relations – however
those relations may further be conceptualized in order to answer
causal questions occurring in particular contexts.
Causal reasoning in physical contexts fundamentally relies on causal
asymmetry: If C causes E, then E does not cause C. Coupling this causal
asymmetry with temporal asymmetry we get that C is temporally prior to
E if C causes E. It is this line of reasoning, which seems to be Bartels and
Wohlfarth’s motivation for grounding causal relations in the time-asymmetry
of certain models of GR.
Now, in a ﬁrst attempt to carve out the logical structure of Bartels and
Wohlfarth’s central claim we might look at the following formula:
∀C,E ∈ E
(
C  E ⇐⇒ ∃f(C f E)
)
(3)
with E the global set of events, ‘’ representing the time-asymmetric causal
connectedness between two events, and ‘ f’ representing the time-asymmetric
energy ﬂow f between two events.
Now, as far as we can see all causal theories agree with ‘⇐=’, in fact,
most (if not all) formal theories of causation will use this direction as one of
the crucial applicability benchmarks – in general: The postulation of energy
ﬂow between two events supports the intuition that these two events are
bound causally in a push-pull way, even if C is not an actual, maybe only a
contributing cause of some eﬀect E.
The other direction, though, seems to raise some questions: The set E
will have to be restricted in a suitable manner to allow for such an inference.
As said above, omissions and non-occurrences are excluded by Bartels and
Wohlfarth themselves, who admittedly aim for some (limited) concept of
physical causation.
Now, any potential restrictions should be explicitly expressible – we might
consequently modify our formula above by imposing a set of conditions Γ on
C and E:
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∀C,E ∈ E
(
Γ =⇒
(
C  E ⇐⇒ ∃f(C f E)
))
(4)
What might Γ stand for? If the premises of the right-hand side (e.g.,
the existence of a distinguished physical vector along which the direction of
energy ﬂow is to be aligned) turn out to constitute the basis for the left-hand
side as well, the biconditional thus formulated might become insubstantially
thin in the end. If by narrowing down potential C–E pairs only process-like
connected Cs and Es remain, we are essentially left with postulating ‘mea-
surable exchange of conserved quantities’ as an explication of ‘’, or simply
put: ‘energy ﬂow’. The question remains: If the proposed biconditional is
not a deﬁnition, what intuitions ought ‘’ to capture above and beyond
‘∃f(· f ·)’?
4 Arrows and Targets
Bartels and Wohlfarth’s paper provides an interesting answer to Russell’s
fundamental critique in considering time-asymmetric solutions of a time-
symmetric physical law on which causal asymmetry might then be based
in turn, “a sine qua non condition for the existence of causal relations”, in
any case a condition that usually has the status of an unquestioned, almost
axiomatic precondition for causal analysis. The authors consequently aim to
establish a weak causal arrow:
Causal relations between events have a substantial (not conven-
tional) time-direction that is in line with one of the global time-
directions which are substantially (not conventionally) diﬀerent
in virtue of their particular geometrical characteristics.
In their investigations the authors make out the asymmetry of global time
upon which causal relations might be based, ﬁnally. However, this should
be distinguished from a much stronger claim: the problem of the strong
causal arrow, where one has to show additionally which global direction is
the future and which the past direction we experience in daily life. Using
this distinction one has to be attentive not to mix problems concerning the
arrow of time and causality, though they are surely associated, as we could
see in this paper.
We agree with Bartels and Wohlfarth’s critique of (Castagnino and Lom-
bardi, 2009) at the end of their paper: It is too simple to merely stipulate
that the future direction coincides with the direction of positive local en-
ergy ﬂow. Instead, one should state that the geometrical development of
space with respect to global time characterizes future and past. This can
then be utilized to deﬁne local future and local past and to ﬁnally anchor
causal connections in physical concepts – in models where the transition from
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global time to a local one is possible. However, although the directionality
of time might well be the common thread of asymmetric energy ﬂow and the
asymmetry of causation, it still remains unclear in the paper why exactly
‘’ should be named ‘causal’, and if so, what exactly the meaning of this
attribute (undeﬁned until last) might actually be.
Looking at the big picture, it will be inevitable to determine whether our
actual world can be described in accordance with the physical restrictions
Bartels and Wohlfarth impose on the general relativistic space-time model
they use in the ﬁrst place, such that their causal notion can truly be based
in nature. We ﬁnd the idea of geometrically grounding causation in physics
by formally building on time-asymmetry very fruitful – next targets could be
the problem of the strong causal arrow as well as the clariﬁcation of how this
construction connects with other theoretical approaches towards causation.
References
Bartels, A. and Wohlfarth, D. (2014). How fundamental physics represents
causality. In Galavotti, M. C. et al., editors, New Directions in the Phi-
losophy of Science. Springer.
Castagnino, M., Lara, L., and Lombardi, O. (2003a). The cosmological origin
of time asymmetry. Classical and Quantum Gravity, 20(2):369.
Castagnino, M., Lara, L., and Lombardi, O. (2003b). The direction of time:
From the global arrow to the local arrow. International Journal of Theo-
retical Physics, 42:2487–2504.
Castagnino, M. and Lombardi, O. (2009). The global non-entropic arrow of
time: From global geometrical asymmetry to local energy ﬂow. Synthese,
169(1):1–25.
Castagnino, M., Lombardi, O., and Lara, L. (2003c). The global arrow of
time as a geometrical property of the universe. Foundations of Physics,
33:877–912.
Curiel, E. (2000). The constraints general relativity places on physicalist
accounts of causality. Theoria – Segunda Época, 15(1):33–58.
Dowe, P. (2000). Physical Causation. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Griﬃths, D. (1999). Introduction to electrodynamics. Upper Saddle River,
New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Lam, V. (2005). Causation and space-time. History and Philosophy of the
Life Sciences, 27(3–4):465–478.
10
Norton, J. D. (2007). Causation as folk science. In Price, H. and Corry, R.,
editors, Causation, Physics and the Constitution of Reality. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Rueger, A. (1998). Local theories of causation and the a posteriori identiﬁ-
cation of the causal relation. Erkenntnis, 48:25–38.
Russell, B. (1912). On the notion of cause. In Proceedings of the Aristotelian
society, volume 13, pages 1–26.
Salmon, W. (1997). Causality and explanation: A reply to two critiques.
Philosophy of Science, 64:461–77.
11
